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Canadian Entrepreneurs and the Preservation of the Capitalist Peace in the North 
Atlantic Triangle in the Civil War Era, 1861-1871 
Introduction 
 
In their 2013 book Reimagining Business History, Philip Scranton and Patrick 
Fridenson called on business historians to reassess militarization and the “two-way 
exchanges” between the military and the private sector.1 The call is timely. The extensive 
business-historical scholarship on the relationship between companies and war sensibly 
focuses on companies that profited from their involvement in the military-industrial 
complex.2 The business-historical literature is virtually silent, however, on the role of 
business in preventing wars from starting in the first place. In other words, business 
historians have  missed a productive opportunity to engage with Capitalist Peace Theory 
(CPT), an increasingly important theory in the discipline of International Relations (IR).  
Many IR scholars now argue that the mutual economic interdependence characteristic of 
global capitalism reduces the likelihood of war. Their research suggests that while extensive 
cross-border economic linkages do not preclude the possibility of war, the creation of a 
transnational community of economic interests tends, ceteris paribus,  to reduce the 
frequency, duration, and intensity of warfare.4 This paper, which is informed by Capitalist 
Peace Theory (CPT), is about a turning point in the relationships between Britain, the United 
States, and the British colony of Canada. In the 1860s, the British Empire and the United 
States came to the brink of war. Canadians were especially concerned that the Anglo-
American War of 1812-1815 might be repeated, this time with a deadlier generation of 
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weapons. The War of 1812 had involved a US invasion of Canada and the widespread 
destruction of life and property there. This article argues that Canadian entrepreneurs 
played an active and important role in preserving peace between the United States and the 
British Empire during the tumultuous period surrounding the American Civil War.5  
 
Canadian entrepreneurs in the 1860s built the capitalist peace in a variety of ways. In 
particular, they resisted British plans for the remilitarization of the Canada-US border and 
the Great Lakes, the bodies of water shared by the two countries. Rather than being 
informed by religious pacifism of the type espoused by Quakers, the thinking of Canada’s 
anti-militarist entrepreneurs was informed by Enlightenment-derived assumptions that the 
best way to avoid war was to increase trade. Their efforts to promote the idea of peace 
through trade contributed to and continued well after the signing of the Treaty of 
Washington in 1871. The treaty settled a broad range of disagreements between the United 
States and the British Empire, established an arbitration procedure for others, and set the 
foundations for progressively closer relations between London and Washington. Although 
Britain was responsible for Canada’s foreign relations in this period, the residents of this 
self-governing British colony were anything but passive participants in the process that led 
to the Treaty of Washington.  
 
Historians and IR scholars have published extensively on the impact of the American 
Civil War on the security relationship of Britain, the United States, and Canada.21 
Unfortunately, our understanding of the role of business in the preservation of peace 
                                                          
5 In this paper, the term “Canadians” will refer to all inhabitants of British North America, even though it 
is technically anachronistic to apply the term to inhabitants of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick before 1 
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between the United States and the British Empire in the 1860s is still underdeveloped. 
Kenneth Bourne observed in his 1967 study of nineteenth-century relations between Britain 
and the United States that trans-Atlantic trade was “a peace factor.”23 However, he did not 
develop this idea The most recent detailed study of Anglo-American diplomacy in the Civil 
War Era, Jay Sexton’s 2005 Debtor Diplomacy, emphasizes the role of London and Wall 
Street bankers in lobbying their respective governments to avoid war. Sexton’s book 
certainly acknowledges the role of Sir John Rose, a supremely well-connected Canadian 
financier-politician in brokering the diplomatic settlement that resulted in the 1871 Treaty 
of Washington.25 Rose, who had recently relocated from Canada to Britain,  was a partner in 
the London branch of a Wall Street bank, and had retained close connections to Canada’s 
most influential financial institution,Bank of Montreal.27  Sexton’s research on Rose’s role as 
a trusted go-between linking policymakers in London and Washington is important as it 
allows us to connect the abstractions of CPT to a specific episode in diplomatic history. 
Sexton’s book, which is specifically focused on high finance, does not discuss the role of 
other Canadian businessmen in influencing the Anglo-American relationship and in building 
the capitalist peace in during and immediately after the American Civil War. This paper 
explores the role of this latter group of Canadian businessmen. If their individual influence 
was limited, their collective stand on questions of war and peace in North America made a 
significant impact on the direction of military policy in Canada.  
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The Development of Commercial Anti-Militarism in the English-speaking 
World 
 
 
Throughout history, the typical merchant has likely dreaded military conflict.31 The 
Enlightenment saw the emergence of a consciously articulated, coherent ideology of 
capitalist anti-militarism. Enlightenment thinkers argued that the commercialization of 
society and the growth of cross-border economic interdependence would reduce the 
frequency and severity of warfare. 32    Their writings had a lasting influence:  in the 
nineteenth century, the idea that cross-border commerce promoted peace was 
disseminated by peace societies in many countries.38 In Britain, the peace movement was 
associated with the laissez-faire, low-tax ideology of Manchester liberalism  and the factory 
owner and MP Richard Cobden.41 Cobden argued that if another nation was threatening 
one’s country, the best course of action was actually to reduce the size of one’s own military 
while befriending the population of the other country through commercial 
interdependence.  45 Similar ideas were promoted in the United States by the New York 
Peace Society (established in 1815) and the American Peace Society (established in 1828). 46  
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The Civil War divided the US Peace Societies, with  some members, such as Senator 
Charles Sumner of Massachusetts, viewing the conflict as a rare example of a “just war.”49  
Other pacifists, including several who were equally committed to the end of Black slavery, 
became part of an unwieldy anti-war coalition that included Copperhead Democrats, 
outright Southern sympathizers, and merchants who simply regarded the war as bad for 
business.50 During the Civil War, most people in the North abandoned or at least suspended 
their traditional opposition to standing armies, which allowed  Lincoln  to build a powerful 
military backed by conscription and income taxes. 53  However, with the coming of the peace 
in 1865, the traditional opposition to standing armies and high taxes reasserted itself in the 
form of electoral pressure for a dramatic reduction in the size of the military.54 Rapid 
demobilization  in the summer of 1865 meant that within a few months of the surrender of 
the South, the United States had a much smaller army at its disposal for use against 
perceived foreign and domestic  enemies.  
 
 Table 1. US Defence Spending as a Percentage of GDP, 1860-187055 
1860 0.67 
1861 0.79 
1862 7.57 
1863 8.70 
1864 8.26 
1865 11.84 
1866 3.82 
1867 1.76 
1868 2.12 
1869 1.62 
                                                          
49 McGee speaking in Parliamentary Debates on the Subject of the Confederation of the British North 
American Provinces (Quebec: Hunter, Rose & Co., 1865), 130. 
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of America (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2012), 200, 212; The Advocate of Peace, “Colonel Roosevelt 
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1870 1.39 
 
 
Canadians of this period were avid readers of US and British books and periodicals 
and thus had the opportunity to learn about the Enlightenment-derived arguments used by 
the British and American peace societies.   In the 1850s, the local press discussed the peace 
movement, as did the popular Nova Scotian novelist Thomas Chandler Haliburton.56 Events 
in the 1860s would bring questions of war and peace forcefully home to Canadians. During 
the first year of the American Civil War, Palmerston’s government dispatched additional 
troops to Canada and took other steps for the defence of Canada in the event of an 
outbreak of hostilities with the republic. These moves alarmed classical-liberal businessmen 
in both Canada and Britain. Cobden’s 1862 pamphlet, The Three Panics denounced these 
moves as yet another example of gratuitous militarism. 59  Taking a less polemic tone, 
business interests in Britain also encouraged their government to adopt a conciliatory 
attitude to the United States and to avoid war at all costs. Commercial interdependency 
between Britain and the United States had had become an important foundation of British 
economic activity in the post-Napoleonic era. On the eve of the Civil War, bilateral trade 
flourished with the British exporting manufactured goods and the Americans exporting 
Northern wheat and Southern cotton.60 The antebellum period also saw substantial British 
investment in US securities, land, and other assets.61 The financial houses that specialized in 
trans-Atlantic trade and investment, such as J. Pierpont Morgan & Co.  and Baring Brothers, 
had extensive commercial and kinship networks on both sides of the Atlantic.62 They 
naturally favoured the maintenance of peace between Britain and the United States. During 
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the Civil War, the London banker Thomas Baring MP repeatedly encouraged the British 
government to adopt a conciliatory policy towards the United States.63  
 
During the first few months of the Civil War, British public and parliamentary opinion 
had polarized into pro-Southern and pro-Northern camps. Britain recognized the 
“belligerency” of the South, which allowed it to issue bonds and purchase warships in 
Britain. In late 1861, two Confederate officials were seized from RMS Trent, by an 
overzealous US naval captain.  When it learned of the seizure of these men from a British 
ship, the British government issued an ultimatum demanding their release.64 Lincoln’s 
Cabinet then reluctantly agreed to release the prisoners. Word that the United States had 
acquiesced reached Britain in early January and was greeted by widespread relief.65 During 
the Trent Affair, the British government despatched troops to Canada to reinforce garrisons 
along the United States border.67  To complicate the situation, some of the British officers 
sent to defend the Canadian frontier were notorious for their pro-Southern views.68  
Canadian public opinion was itself divided between those who supported the North and 
those who were more sympathetic to the Southern Confederacy.69 Canadians’ ambivalent 
attitudes to the Civil War meant that the colonies could and were used as a base of 
operations for Confederate blockade runners and fifth columnists, much to the resentment 
of people in the North.70  Some Canadians, including several businessmen, openly 
sympathized  with the Southern Confederacy, helped Confederate agents to mount cross-
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border raids, and urged Canadians to prepare for war with the United States. 71  Pro-
Southern sentiments continued to be expressed after the defeat of the Confederacy: when 
Jefferson Davis, the former President of the Confederacy, visited Toronto in June 1867, he 
was received by a cheering crowds of six to seven thousand people before dining with a 
welcoming party of prominent local citizens.72  
 
The fact that a large minority of Canadians openly sympathized with the South is 
striking when one considers how integrated Canada’s economy was with that of the 
neighbouring Northern states. As Table 1 indicates, the relative importance of the United 
States as a destination for Canada’s exports increased after the implementation of the 
Reciprocity free trade agreement in 1855, although economic historians caution that this 
increase may have been due more to the completion of cross-border railways than the 
reduction in tariffs. The 1850s saw a surge in Canada’s timber exports to the United States, 
whereas Great Britain had previously been Canada’s primary customer.73 Canadian 
entrepreneurs took advantage of the new availability of the US market and upgraded from 
the export of lightly-processed logs, square timber, into the production of value-added 
goods, such as boards and planks, for exports. 74 Canadians were also conscious of the 
increase in exports of wheat, barley, and animals to the United States in this period.75 Table 
2 indicates that in most years, Canada ran a trade deficit with the United States: Canadians 
paid for the American goods they consumed by exporting to Britain, where they earned 
sterling for use in the US market. Britain’s own balance of payments with the United States 
included capital flows, trade in services, as well as trade in visible goods.76 Canadians were 
                                                          
71 George T Denison, The Struggle for Imperial Unity; Recollections and Experiences (London: 
Macmillan and co, 1909), 82; George Taylor Denison, Canada: is She Prepared for War? (Toronto: 
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72 New York Times, 13 June 1867. 
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 Officer and Smith, “Reciprocity Treaty,” 612. 
74
 A.R.M. Lower, and William A. Carrothers, and Stanley Alexander Saunders, The North American 
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York: Greenwood Press, 1968), 137-149. 
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thus part of a complicated web of payments linking countries on both sides of the Atlantic. 
The sheer interconnectedness of the Canadian, US, and British economies predisposed 
Canadian entrepreneurs to favour political solutions that preserved flows of goods and 
capital.    
Table 2: Canada’s Trade with the United States and Rest of World, 1850-1868 
(Figures in Thousands of Dollars)77 
 
 
Year Canada’s Total 
Exports 
Canada’s 
Exports 
to the 
US 
US Share 
of 
Canada’s 
Exports (%) 
Canada’
s Total 
Imports 
Canada’
s 
Imports 
from US 
US 
Share of 
Canada’
s 
Imports 
(%) 
Canada’s 
Trade 
Surplus/Defici
ts With the US 
1850 11,960 4,952 41.4 16,980 6,596 38.8 -1,644 
1851 12,964 4,072 31.4 21,432 8,364 39.0 -4,292 
1851 14,056 6,284 44.7 20,284 8,476 41.8 -2,192 
1853 22,012 9,036 41.1 31,980 11,780 36.8 -2,744 
1854 21,248 8,648 40.7 40,528 15,532 38.3 -6,884 
1855 24,924 16,736 67.1 36,085 20,828 57.7 -4,092 
1856 29,808 17,980 60.3 43,534 22,654 52.0 -4,674 
1857 25,448 13,208 51.9 39,432 20,224 51.3 -7,016 
1858 22,029 11,930 54.2 29,078 15,635 53.8 -3,705 
1859 23,102 13,922 60.3 33,555 17,593 52.4 -3,671 
1860 32,361 18,428 56.9 34,446 17,273 50.1 1,155 
1861 34,717 14,386 41.4 43,055 21,069 48.9 -6,683 
1862 31,679 15,064 47.6 48,600 25,173 51.8 -10,109 
1863 39,347 20,050 51.0 45,964 23,109 50.3 -3,059 
1864 12,907 7,722 59.8 23,883 10,427 43.7 -2,705 
1865 39,608 22,939 57.9 44,620 19,589 43.9 3,350 
1866 50,257 34,770 69.2 53,802 20,424 38.0 14,346 
1867 44,970 25,584 56.9 59,050 20,273 34.3 5,311 
1868 44,538 24,350 54.7 57,248 22,454 39.2 1,896 
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 Table based on Officer and Smith, “Reciprocity Treaty,” p. 600. Calculations by authors. 
  
The aggregate trade data in Table 1 should be read with the understanding that local and 
regional conditions varied widely.Some regional economies like that of Quebec City were timber 
based, export oriented and depended on British markets. 78 A growing number of Canadian regions 
were increasingly tied to the Canada-US trade, especially after the passage of the Reciprocity Treaty 
that permitted freer trade. The Treaty resulted in a rapid expansion of so-called “trade of 
convenience,” as entrepreneurs took advantage of their new ability to trade with each other by 
conducting many small transactions. 79  Those regions produced the most forceful opposition to the 
militarization of the Canada-US border. The data in Table 2 do not capture all of the cross-border 
economic ties that influenced how Canadians viewed their security relationship with the United 
States, for flows of labour, capital, and technological expertise will also important factors. For 
instance, in the petroleum rich regions that experienced an oil-boom in the 1860s, workers from the 
older oilfields of Pennsylvania brought crucial know-how.81 US FDI in the Canadian manufacturing 
and mining sectors was also growing in this period.82  In sum, the economic relationship between 
Canada and the United States was increasing in both complexity and relative importance in this 
period. We argue that this economic reality encouraged Canadian entrepreneurs to adopt a 
staunchly anti-militarization stance.  
 
 
 
Competing Security Paradigms in British North America  
 
 
It was in this tense context that discussions over the defence of Canada would 
unfold.  In the aftermath of the Trent Affair, the British government began to overhaul its 
plans for the defence of Canada and the sharing of the attendant financial burdens. 
Previously, the Province of Canada had left military spending to the imperial government, 
relying primarily on British regulars and the goodwill of the United States for its defence. 83  
Efforts to strengthen the Canadian militia during the Crimean War and the Indian Mutiny 
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83 Charles Perry Stacey, Canada and the British Army, 1846-1871: a Study in the Practice of Responsible 
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were both modest and temporary.84  The Trent Affair, therefore, was a godsend for the 
Canadian advocates of a strong and well-funded Canadian army. 85 At the time of the Trent 
Affair, Canada was governed by an unstable coalition of conservative factions. After 1861, 
the British government began pressuring the Canadian government to create an effective 
military force to fight alongside British regulars in the event of an American invasion.  The 
Canadian government responded by planning to create an “active militia” of 50,000 men 
who would volunteer or be conscripted if necessary. The armed forces were to be 
supplemented by gunboats on the Great Lakes. The estimated cost of this defence plan, 
$1.1m, alarmed many taxpayers. 87 Most controversial, however, was the spectre of 
conscription and the renavalization of Great Lakes, waters that had been effectively 
denavalized since 1817. The measure was so unpopular with the public and backbenchers 
that the Militia Bill led to the fall of the Canadian government and its replacement with a 
new ministry that included many classical liberals who identified with Britain’s Liberal 
Party.88  The defeat of the Militia Bill was reported by newspapers in Britain, where 
Canada’s apparent unwillingness to pay for its own defence generated a negative reaction.89   
 
The Minister of Finance in the new government was Montreal entrepreneur Luther 
Hamilton Holton. Holton was born in 1817 to American parents who had moved to present-
day Ontario on the eve of the War of 1812. In the 1840s, Holton prospered through his 
involvement in the trading networks that ran through Montreal and which linked wheat-
growing communities around the Great Lakes to consumers in Europe. He acquired a fleet 
of steamships for moving grain.90  Throughout his career as a legislator, Holton was noted 
for his belief in the classical liberal doctrines of “Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, and John 
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90 Henry C. Klassen,  Luther H. Holton: A Founding Canadian Entrepreneur (Calgary: University of Calgary 
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Bright.”91  In July 1866, the New York Tribune reported that Holton enjoyed the support of 
most of the “commercial classes” of Montreal, Canada’s commercial capital.92 
 
 In the 1850s and 1860s, Montreal “commercial classes” had strong and multiplying 
ties to the United States, although ties to Glasgow, Liverpool, and London remained 
important. The volume of Canada-US trade increased in the period 1854-1866, when there 
was free trade in natural products between the two countries, although economic historians 
have cautioned that much of the prosperity Canada enjoyed under the 1854 Elgin-Marcy 
Treaty was due to factors independent of the treaty, such as the land boom in Upper 
Canada, good harvests, and the strong demand for Canadian commodities during the 
American Civil War.93 As Canada’s principal financial centre, Montreal and its capitalists 
eagerly pushed into new markets and sought new opportunities in the United States. Here, 
the activities of Canada’s oldest and largest financial institution, the Bank of Montreal, are 
of particular importance. The Bank established a New York agency in 1858 to sell 
commercial paper and to deal in foreign exchange. In 1861, it opened a lucrative agency in 
Chicago “to capture a portion of the great produce trade.” During the Trent Affair, the bank 
had briefly restricted the extension of credit in Chicago.94 After this dispute was resolved 
peacefully, the turnover of this agency increased steadily throughout the 1860s as Chicago’s 
role in the handling of agricultural commodities flourished. 95 New York City was, however, 
the most important US market for the Bank. By the early 1860s, the Bank of Montreal, 
which was then larger than any bank in the United States, was “probably the largest and 
most powerful transactor in the New York money market, where it maintained and 
employed immense sums.”96 After the outbreak of the Civil War, the Bank also traded 
heavily on the loan security of the United States Federal Stock with very healthy margins of 
not less than 10%.97  
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The greatest opportunity for Canadian bankers in the 1860s was the New York gold 
market. The departure of the United States from the gold standard had put gold to a 
premium against greenbacks that reached its zenith at 300% of average values. The Bank of 
Montreal took full advantage of its plentiful gold reserves to reap considerable profit from 
the demand in the New York market. The bank’s borrowers offered United States fiat 
currency as security on the loans, which in turn allowed the Bank to employ that capital in 
discounting trade bills in the city. From a single source, therefore, came a double profit.98 In 
1868 the Bank’s New York agency received a four-fold jump in its asset allocation, from $1.2 
million to $8.8 million, half of that in gold to satisfy the voracious demand for specie in the 
New York market.99  All major Canadian banks participated in this market, but the Bank of 
Montreal’s share of the Canadian business was 78%. Its share of the $20 million gold market 
was $7.8 million.100   
 
While the wartime conditions in the New York money market created opportunities 
for unusually high profits, the Bank also confronted risks related to the possibility of a war 
between the British Empire and the United States. Such a war risked destroying the value of 
the Bank of Montreal’s claims on counterparties in the United States: in wartime, it 
becomes illegal to make payments to enemy alien individuals and firms, even for debts 
contracted before the outbreak of the hostilities.101 Faced with this elevated level of 
political risk, the Bank responded by “shoring up” gold reserves, a form of self-insurance 
that required the diversion of capital from other purposes.103  In his correspondence with a 
London banker, Bank of Montreal director Thomas Rose stressed that good relations with 
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the United States were absolutely essential for Canadian business interests.104 In January 
1865, Rose bemoaned the prospect of the re-navalization of the Great Lakes, declaring that 
Canadians were “determined that should there ever be war England vs. US it will not be 
because Canada had antagonized US.”105 In view of his belief in the commercial importance 
of Anglo-American amity, it is not surprising that Rose later invested considerable time in 
helping to broker to the Anglo-American agreement that became the 1871 Treaty of 
Washington.  
 
The Bank’s cross-border links continued to multiply during Luther Holton’s term as 
the Province of Canada’s Minister of Finance between 1862 and 1864. In his maiden budget 
speech, Holton made it clear that his primary goal was to reduce government spending.106   
The ministry of which Holton was part resisted British pressure to increase military 
spending. After sustained pressure from the Crown’s Canadian representative, the Canadian 
government eventually acquiesced to an increase, but it only agreed to a compromise plan 
that doubled the size of the existing purely voluntary militia. This militia was comprised of 
reservists who were paid to train each year. This plan tripled the defence budget of the 
previous year, yet it was a partial victory for the anti-militarists in that it was two-thirds 
cheaper than the original plan that had led to the downfall of the last government in 1862. 
107 The government’s reluctance to spend money on the military was reinforced by the 
Toronto Globe, which argued that arming in anticipation of the distant possibility of invasion 
would actually be counterproductive and that “trading” and ordinary “social intercourse” 
were the best ways of preserving peace between Canada and the United States. 108  
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Advocates of the Capitalist Peace and the Jervois Report  
 
 The ministry of which Luther Holton was part was defeated in early 1864 over the 
issue of state funding for Catholic schools, an issue unrelated to the main theme of this 
paper. Chronic political instability and the constant threat of military conflict led to a new 
coalition determined to federate the colonies of British North America. Accordingly, 
Canada’s new grand coalition government began talks with the other British colonies in 
North America to gauge interest in such a scheme.  The new ministry included George-
Étienne Cartier and John A. Macdonald, the authors of the ambitious but ill-fated 1862 
Militia Bill, as well as George Brown, who had opposed it. It was, therefore, unclear whether 
Canada would undertake additional actions to militarize its frontier with the United States. 
Meanwhile, the strategic position of the South was becoming increasingly desperate, with 
the capture and destruction of Atlanta by the Union army and Lincoln’s re-election in 
November 1864. The North’s territorial gains continued in early 1865, culminating in Robert 
E. Lee’s surrender and the end of the Civil War in April 1865.  From a Canadian and British 
military planning perspective, the presence of a large, experienced, victorious and fully 
mobilized army on the borders of Canada was a threat.  
 
Debates about the defence of Canada centred on the reports written by Lieutenant-
Colonel William Francis Jervois, an experienced British military engineer who had earlier 
designed fortifications in South Africa and Britain. Jervois believed that since war between 
the British Empire and the United States was likely, immediate preparations should be 
made. His reports, which were published in February 1864 and January 1865, recommended 
the fortification of the largest Canadian cities,  the construction of a fleet of iron-clads on 
Lake Ontario, and the creation of a Canadian army of 25,000 to fight alongside British troops 
in the event of an American invasion.109 Jervois estimated the initial costs of $10 million in 
the first year and between $3 million to $4 million thereafter.110  
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Jervois’s reports provoked the advocates of the capitalist peace on both sides of the 
Atlantic. The Jervois proposals required British parliamentary approval, and that provided 
the arena for the first round of the debate. The planned debate even roused Richard 
Cobden from his deathbed to travel to London either to deliver one last speech against this 
latest manifestation of militarism. However, he was too ill to speak and soon died.111  
Instead, Cobden’s close associate, the Quaker industrialist John Bright, led the attack on 
Jervois’s Canadian defence plan when it came before the British parliament on 13 March 
1865. 112   
 
Outside Parliament, Canadian entrepreneurs of the anti-militarist camp continued 
the attack on the Jervois recommendations by emphasizing its fundamentally wrong-headed 
approach. Although these they never established a formal organization to coordinate their 
opposition to the proposed militarization of their society, anti-militarist entrepreneurs in 
different Canadian cities frequently used remarkably similar arguments. In their eyes, more 
cross-border trade, not more fortresses, was the best way of increasing the chances of 
peace. One such advocate of peace through trade was Erastus Wiman, the editor of the 
Montreal Trade Review, an influential commercial magazine. Wiman also managed the 
Canadian subsidiary of the Mercantile Agency, a New York credit-reporting firm that served 
businessmen throughout North America who wanted to verify the creditworthiness of 
potential business partners. During the Civil War, when the Mercantile Agency’s revenues 
from its southern branches had been dramatically reduced, profits from the Montreal and 
Toronto branches had been increasingly important to the parent company in New York.113   
American businessmen used Wiman’s agency to investigate Canadian businessmen and vice 
versa, which meant that his profits depended, in part, on a sustained level of cross-border 
trade.  It is not surprising, therefore, that Wiman’s magazine deplored the plans for the 
militarization of the Canada-US border.   
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Table 2. Receipts and Expenditures of Mercantile Agency Branches, 1863 114 
Office  
Gross 
Receipts  
Gross 
Expenses Net Profits  Profits/Receipts 
Philadelphia $11,375 $8,428 $2,947 0.259076923 
Chicago $5,178 $4,646 $532 0.102742372 
St Louis  $791 $2,419 -$1,628 -2.058154235 
Cincinnati  $7,027 $5,608 $1,419 0.201935392 
Detroit $2,492 $2,012 $480 0.192616372 
Cleveland $3,286 $1,822 $1,464 0.445526476 
Milwaukee $2,919 $2,004 $915 0.313463515 
Montreal $16,084 $6,429 $9,655 0.600285999 
Toronto $8,995 $4,443 $4,552 0.506058922 
Entire Company  $58,147 $37,811 $20,336 0.349734294 
 
 
In a May 1865 editorial on the defence of Canada, the Montreal Trade Review 
argued that a war fought along the lines proposed by Jervois would be a disaster for 
Canadians even if Britain ultimately emerged technically victorious. The editorial, which was 
almost certainly written by Wiman, drew on Cobden’s theory that cross-border trade 
promotes peace. The editorial condemned the proposed military expenditure as “utter 
folly” and declared that “commercial ties and interest” would be a much more effective 
defence of the peace than any “redoubts or bastions.”115 The paper argued that building 
more canals to bring produce from the mid-western United States to Montreal would be a 
better use of the money than armaments and fortifications. Not only would canals cost less 
than Jervois’s defensive scheme, but the resulting increase in cross-border trade would “be 
a cause of friendship with the western states, which would do more than anything else to 
secure us against war with the United States.”116  
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The anti-militarist position of Holton and Wiman was sensational, but it was far from 
a unanimous verdict among Canadian businessmen. There was indeed a section of the 
Canadian bourgeoisie that supported the Jervois plan and other measures designed to 
militarize Canadian society and the Canada-US border. Several groups of businessmen in 
Canada had a vested interest in increased military spending. In a garrison towns such as 
Montreal and Kingston,  British military spending was very important to the local economy, 
since the presence of so many soldiers created demand for local businesses.120 One of the 
businessmen who stood to benefit from re-armament  was Casimir Gzowksi, a Polish émigré 
who owned a thriving civil engineering firm. Gzowksi, who was an officer in the Canadian 
militia, advocated the re-militarization of the Canadian frontier and the construction of 
elaborate fortifications around Montreal and perhaps other Canadian cities.  Gzowksi  could 
have reasonably expected that  some of the work of building these fortifications would be 
given to his contracting firm.  In 1864, Gzowksi and a group of Toronto businessmen 
concerned about a possible American invasion protested a proposed reduction in the 
number of British soldiers in Canada. 121  
 
Canadian pro-Confederate sympathies were considered provocative and offensive, 
even if those views were espoused by a minority. . 125   However, Canadian opposition to the 
British proposals to re-militarize the Canada-US border was extensively reported in the US. 
126  For instance, a newspaper in Cleveland, Ohio noted that while the Canadian Cabinet 
wanted to put a fleet of gunboats on the Great Lakes, this proposal had been controversial 
in the Canadian parliament.127  Moreover, an insurance broker and medical doctor in a 
Canadian border town wrote to President Lincoln to denounce from the anti-US statements 
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that had been made by prominent Britons and Canadians.128 By sharply and vocally 
dissenting from and resisting the proposals for the re-militarization of the border with the 
United States, Canada’s anti-militarist entrepreneurs made Americans were aware that a 
large segment of the Canadian population did not want to prepare for even the possibility of 
war with the United States.  Indeed, a New York newspaper declared in 1865 that in the 
event of an Anglo-American war, the pragmatic Canadians would likely negotiate a 
neutrality arrangement.129  US awareness of the diversity of Canadians’ attitudes informed 
US thinking about Canada in subsequent years. 
 
 
The Dominion of Canada came into existence on 1 July 1867.  This federation 
included the Province of Canada, which became the provinces of Ontario and Quebec, along 
with Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. The first Canadian ministry’s first priority was to 
develop plans to defend the border against the United States. These plans were prioritized 
because Canada had been subjected to attacks by the Fenian Brotherhood, an Irish-
American paramilitary group, since 1866. The Fenians believed that attacking Britain’s North 
American colonies might somehow  result in Ireland’s  independence. Although the 
American government eventually took steps to prevent the Fenians from using US soil to 
attack Canada, cross-border raids  continued to 1870. The most important clash with the 
Fenians occurred in the Niagara Peninsula in June 1866, when a force of Canadian 
militiamen succeeded in repulsing a disorganized group. 131 The Fenian Raids, along with the 
more distant but still seemingly plausible threat of an invasion by the US military, 
encouraged Canadians to seriously consider the defences of the new Dominion.  
 
  In March 1868, the Minister of Militia, George-Etienne Cartier, presented a detailed 
plan for a robust Canadian military to the House of Commons. It involved the creation of an 
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“active militia” to man the fortresses and operate artillery. In the event of an invasion, it 
would be assisted by the “sedentary militia”, which would include every able-bodied male 
British subject between the ages of 21 and 40.132 At the same time, Sir Patrick Leonard 
MacDougall of the Canadian Department of Militia advocated the fortification of Canada’s 
frontier with the United States.133 The Canadian government’s plan provided for an effective 
volunteer fighting force of 40,000 soldiers, Great Lakes gunboats, and the construction of 
elaborate fortifications to protect Canada’s cities. If insufficient volunteers  materialised, the 
government would resort to conscription.  In introducing his plan, the Minister of Militia 
declared that while Canada currently possessed some of the elements of “national power,” 
such as maritime strength and territorial extent, “the military element still remained 
necessary for the completion of national greatness.”134  
 
The 1868 Militia Bill provoked strong negative reactions from the Liberal opposition 
reminiscent of their similar opposition to the 1862 Militia Bill.135  Thomas Oliver MP, a dry 
goods merchant from Ontario, focused on the cost, feared that the proposed expenditure of 
$5,000,000 “was but a beginning.”136  Ebenezer Vining Bodwell’s speech against Cartier’s 
defence plan invoked the Enlightenment idea that cross-border commerce ensures peace. 
This theory was congruent with Bodwell’s lived experience, for he was a merchant from the 
Ontario county of Oxford, which was crossed by the Great Western Railway of Canada, a 
British-owned railway that connected Niagara Falls in New York State with Detroit, 
Michigan.137 Bodwell’s fortunes were thus closely tied to those of these US urban centres. 
Bodwell declared that  “the commercial relations of the  United States with Great Britain are 
such as  to make it the interest of both to preserve  peace” regardless of any disagreement. 
Bodwell’s speech, which included many statistics showing the magnitude of the trade 
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between the two countries,  underlined the idea that preparing for a war with the United 
States was, at best a waste of money, and at worst a recipe for economic suicide for all 
concerned. The debate engaged other MPs whose careers and interests show just how far 
Canadian and American life and commerce were intertwined. Thomas Sutherland Parker 
had studied in Philadelphia before practicing medicine in an Ontario town located near the 
US border.138  Parker believed that war between the two countries was inconceivable and 
that spending “money preparing for an Anglo-American war was [therefore] pointless”. 
Parker did not explain why such a war was impossible, but he did say that any military force 
created by Canada should be inexpensive and designed exclusively for maintaining domestic 
order and repelling small attacks such as that of 1866. The government’s “monstrous” bill, 
he said, involved importing into Canada  “the continental system or that of Europe.”139  
 
Speaking on the same day, James Young MP said “for the first time on this continent 
the germs of the European military system were to be introduced.” Under the government’s 
plan,  “conscription was to replace the volunteer system; and they were to have fortified 
cities and garrisons placed in them; so that, in almost every respect, their system was to be 
a copy of that obtaining on the Continent of Europe.” The result would be economic 
disaster. Although he did not mention it in his speech, Young’s thriving wheel manufacturing 
business was in a town served by the railway company that connected Niagara Falls and 
Detroit, which meant that his private business interests were indirectly linked to the 
financial health of these US cities.140 Young, it should be noted, was a vigorous promoter of 
free trade between Canada and the United States. In 1865, he had won a prize from the 
Montreal Trade Review for an essay on the benefits of liberalized trade for both Canada and 
the United States. 141 As did Bodwell, Young promoted a theory of international relations 
that was congruent with his lived experience and his pecuniary interests. 
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Despite these criticisms, the bill to create a substantial Canadian military was passed. 
The massive militarization envisioned by the Militia Act, however, was never implemented, 
dying a political death.First, while the Minister of Militia was an enthusiast for higher 
military spending, Canada’s Prime Minister, Sir John A. Macdonald was a political pragmatist 
who understood that many Canadians were opposed to increased military spending. 
Throughout the post-1868 period, the Canadian government sought to contain military 
spending, which is perhaps the primary reason why Canada sought to avoid US-style Indian 
Wars  with the native peoples of western  Canada.142 Macdonald’s awareness that voters 
were averse to military spending helps to explain why the plan embodied in the 1868 law 
was not implemented. 
 
Moreover, developments in British politics soon invalidated many of the 
assumptions on which the 1868 militia law had been based. In December 1868, Gladstone’s 
Liberals formed a government in Britain, supported by John Bright and other Radical MPs. 
The new ministry sought to improve relations with the United States, which involved 
convincing the Republic that Britain did not pose a threat. Gladstone’s minister also knew 
that they had to address  American grievances dating from the Civil War. The most 
important of these were the financial claims the United States had presented to the British 
government for losses that had been caused by the privateers the Confederacy had 
purchased from British shipyards. 143  In early 1869, the new Secretary of State for War, 
Edward Cardwell, announced that Britain was going to close the vast majority of its 
garrisons in the Dominion of Canada, including those on the border. 146 This strategy  was 
vigorously protested by the Duke of Cambridge, the head of the British Army.147148   
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Cardwell’s proposal was supported by those advanced Liberals who wished to 
abandon Britain’s military obligations in Canada regardless of the circumstances or actions 
of Canadians. Their ranks included the Liverpool Financial Reform Association, a pressure 
group of tax-averse anti-imperialist businessmen.149 In the middle, were moderate Liberals 
such as Lord John Russell and Lord Granville who said that they would be willing to devote 
British taxes to the defences of Canada provided Canadian taxpayers also displayed a 
willingness to contribute to the military defences of their own country. In a February 1865 
debate on whether to spend money on the defences of Canada, Granville said that “if the 
colony is prepared to take its share in the exertions and expenses which are necessary for its 
defence” Britain would assist it.151 Russell retired from active politics in 1866, but Granville 
served as Gladstone’s Colonial Secretary between 1868 and 1870 and his views doubtless 
reflected those of much of the British Liberal Party.  
  
For these senior Liberal politicians, British expenditure on the military defence of 
Canada would require Canada to display the will and the capacity to create an effective 
deterrent to possible American aggression. Canada’s will was weak and divided on the 
question, even in times of heightened tension. During and after the Trent Crisis in 1861, 
Canadians had vigorously debated whether militarizing the frontier would be the best 
strategy to ensure Canada’s safety. The 1862 Militia Bill was defeated in the Canadian 
legislature. Between 1862 and 1864, the reluctance of the Canadian parliament to authorize 
military expenditure was discussed extensively in the British parliament.152  The anti-
militarist businessmen in the Canadian parliament were not able to prevent the passage of 
the 1868 Militia Bill. However, the grandiose plan for a Canadian army contained in this bill 
was never implemented, likely because the Canadian Prime Minister feared a backlash from 
taxpayers. Given the evident unwillingness of many Canadians to spend on defence and the 
prior statements by Russell and Granville that Britain would only spend money on Canadian 
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defence if Canadian taxpayers also made major contributions, the decision of Gladstone’s 
cabinet to close most of the Canadian garrisons and pursue a policy of conciliation towards 
the United States appears logical.   
 
 
The Canadian response to Cardwell’s plan was divided. In garrison towns reliant on 
British military spending, there were, of course, loud complaints. Canadian Prime Minister 
Sir John A. Macdonald, whose parliamentary constituency (Kingston) was located on the 
border and included a major British fortress, opposed the withdrawal of the British 
troops.153 It should be noted that Kingston’s hitherto prosperous economy slumped after 
the closure of the British garrison in 1870 and did not recover until the twentieth century.154  
Alexander Mackenzie, the leader of Canada’s Liberal Party, declared his support for the 
decision of the British government to withdraw its garrisons from Canada. Mackenzie, MP 
for Lambton County, was a resident of Sarnia -- an unfortified Ontario city separated from 
the state of Michigan by a narrow straight across the St. Clair River.  Mackenzie confidently 
declared that he was “not afraid of the United States,” a view undoubtedly reinforced by 
the fact he could see United States every day from his constituency office”155  
 
The process of winding down the British garrisons in Canada lasted until  November 
1871. Thereafter, the British  government maintained garrisons only at Halifax on the 
Atlantic coast and Esquimault on the Pacific, the two points in Canada the British regarded 
as important to their own defence. Most of the Dominion, however, including its major 
population centres, was effectively demilitarized, save for a small force of part-time 
reservists.156  The fact that historic fortresses now sat essentially vacant was a bold 
affirmation of trust in the good intentions of the United States.  Britain’s decision in the late 
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1860s to remove its garrison from Canada rendered the entire security paradigm implicit in 
the 1868 Militia Bill  obsolete. That Bill was premised on a joint British-colonial defence of 
Canada, a defence plan that never saw the light of day. In June 1872, Canada’s Minister of 
Militia declared in parliament that there was as a grand total of “540” full-time soldiers in 
Canada – far fewer than the 40,000 men under arms envisaged by the 1868 legislation.  
Members of the Liberal opposition declared that even this “standing army” was dangerously 
large and expensive for a country of just 3.6 million.157  Some of the more radical members 
of the Liberal party advocated that even Canada’s system of unpaid volunteers be scrapped. 
These volunteers participated in several days of training each year under the supervision of 
British officers. These training sessions involved overnight stays in camps near major cities. 
The trainees were fed at taxpayer expense, much to the chagrin of the more miserly 
Liberals. Luther Holton complained that the system of unpaid volunteers imposed a double 
burden on the economy, since the annual training days in camps near the major cities 
forced the taxpayer to pay for food and tents and took “young men” away from “the 
industry of the country at great sacrifice.” He declared that the militia was “an unmixed evil” 
and was now entirely superfluous in view of the recent ratification of the Treaty of 
Washington, which had established “perpetual amity” between the British Empire and the 
United States.158 The Minister of Militia retorted that Holton’s belief that “a nation could be 
formed or the peace maintained without” some sort of military was an idea “so childish and 
unmeaning it required no reply.”159   
 
Although it did not mention Holton by name, an article in the Volunteer Review, a 
journal for Canada’s militia officers, lambasted the “small knot of busy and stupid 
conspirators principally to be found in our commercial centres” who were opposed to 
spending on the militia.  According to the Review, “the organs of this party have never 
ceased to howl about the expense, loss of time, inefficiency of the force.” The conspirators, 
it asserted, harboured a secret desire to make Canada part of the United States. Like all 
other members of the “universal peace society,” Canada’s opponents of military spending 
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were motivated by a utopian view of human nature, “that mankind had changed, the lion in 
future may lie down with the lamb, and John Bright’s millennium is about being realized.”160  
 
 
Legacies 
  
In the two decades after 1871, the Canadian federal government did not develop a 
regular army, despite considerable pressure from successive British governments and 
ambitious would-be Canadian generals to do so.161 Instead, it maintained only a small militia 
force suitable for occasional forays against revolting Aboriginals, sectarian mobs, or striking 
workers. The Canadian militia was not, however, capable of mounting any defence against 
an invading American army.  The Canadian government, moreover, displayed little interest 
in establishing a navy and confined itself to acquiring ships for coast guard  work.163 In 1869 
and 1870, spending on defence represented 5.6% and 5.3% of the federal budget. Much of 
this spending was connected to the expeditionary force sent to the area around Winnipeg 
after civil disturbances in 1869-70. In the three subsequent years, defence spending fell to 
4%, 2.6%, and then 3% of the federal budget, the level at which it hovered until an 
Aboriginal rising of 1885, when there was another brief spike. 164  Since we know the 
proportion of the total economy represented by federal spending was approximately 15% in 
this period, these figures indicate that defence spending was a fraction of one percent of 
Canada’s Gross National Product.165 In the United States, which fought several Indian Wars 
in this period, military spending averaged 0.7% of Gross Domestic Product. The equivalent 
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figures for Britain and Germany in late nineteenth century were both 2.6 % of GDP, on 
average.166  In 1884, when the Gladstone ministry was confronted by an uprising by Islamist 
militants in Sudan, Canada’s government adamantly refused to supply troops for a punitive 
expedition. 167  Canada only began to play a major role in the defence of the empire in 1899, 
when it sent troops to serve in the Second South African War. 
 
In the eyes of some contemporaries, the post-1871 demilitarization of Canada 
helped to produce a cultural shift away from the aristocratic-warrior ethos of the British 
officer corps and towards peaceful industry. A New York Times reporter who returned to 
Montreal in 1874 after an absence of fifteen years was struck by the change in the mindset 
of the English-speaking population. Previously, young men from wealthy families had taken 
the officers of the British garrison as role models. They had done so by adopting the officers’ 
gentlemanly disdain for trade, love of “riotous living” and assumption of the “airs of the 
insolent aristocrat.” An unnamed Montreal merchant told the reporter that the closure of 
the British garrison had been a “good thing,” for the garrisons had “dazzled” the city’s young 
men with their “gay uniforms and princely way of life.” Indeed, many of the city’s young 
men had picked up the idea that real men were to be found only in the army “mess-room” 
rather than the counting house or the factory. The women of the city had “made heroes of 
the wearers of scarlet jackets.” All that had now changed and “idleness is no longer 
respectable.” “It is now considered more honourable to try and add to inherited wealth 
than to squander it foolishly.”169 To borrow the terminology of Deirdre McCloskey, 
“bourgeois values” had triumphed over militarist values.170 
 
Conclusion  
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In the 1860s, a diverse group of Canadian businessmen took determined action to 
preserve the capitalist peace.  They resisted British plans for the remilitarization of the 
Canada-US border and the renavalization of the Great Lakes. Canadian anti-militarist 
thinking reflected the Cobdenite theory that increased international trade, not increased 
spending on military deterrents, was the best defence against the possibility of war. The 
anti-militarist businessmen in Canada managed to influence the calculus of British 
policymakers by displaying their unwillingness to contribute to the costs of preparing 
Canada for a war between the British Empire and the United States. The decision by the 
British government in the late 1860s to withdraw most of its garrisons from Canada helped 
to improve Anglo-American relations, thereby creating a virtuous circle of increased 
commercial interdependence and additional improvements in diplomatic relations.  By the 
early twentieth century, war between the British Empire and the United States had become 
unthinkable to most people. Of course, there were exceptions, including a few eccentric 
army officers whose invasion planning continued long after any real military threat against 
Canada had dissipated.171  
 
In time, the North American capitalist peace became a model for Europeans, 172 such 
as Jean Monnet (1888-1979), one of the fathers of the European Economic Community. 
Monnet hoped that economic integration would make war between Germany and France as 
inconceivable as war between the United States and Canada,  countries he had visited on 
business before the First World War. 173 There is considerable evidence that the project of 
building a capitalist peace in the so-called “North Atlantic space” has been accomplished: 
despite its recent problems, the European Union has been a successful post-conflict 
reconciliation initiative. 174  Thanks in part to economic integration, warfare between so-
called “Western countries” is now highly unlikely. In the twenty-first century, we now face 
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the challenge of building a durable peace that includes countries whose governing 
institutions, social and cultural structures, values and religious traditions contrast sharply 
with “the West”.   In thinking about how a transnational and trans-civilizational community 
of interests in favour of peace can be created,  the study of business history can provide 
context for policymakers. CPT can be a useful tool in helping to understand how economic 
interdependence shapes the international system. As such, the theory provides a suggestive 
starting point for historical research. The actors, circumstances and events that shaped the 
triangular relationship between imperial Britain, the United States and Canada in the 1860s 
align well with the central tenets of the theory.  We also suggest that the theory can provide 
a useful framework for business historians of many other countries and periods. 
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